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A review by heathward
Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and Nation Building in the Kennedy Era by Michael E. Latham
5.0
Traditionally, modernisation theory has been seen as a social scientific method which gained popularity in the post-war period for its ability to investigate the differences between the rich and poor nations of the world in a consistent, structured way. Whilst it was acknowledged that the Kennedy administration was influenced by the ideas of the modernisation theorists, the interventionist policies in places such as Latin America and Vietnam which resulted from said influence were considered as genuinely selfless attempts at aiding the poorer countries of the world, ones which tragically failed.
Michael Latham disagrees, and claims that we must look at modernisation theory as an ideology, the American equivalent of the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Soviet Union. Rather than a collection of abstract ideas, modernisation was a state of mind, one which had direct links on policy. Whilst it was dressed up in the language of science and (naturally) modernity, modernisation theory had direct links with earlier American perceptions of the world, an imperial American perception which had been considered long banished.
President Kennedy had long called for a more interventionist foreign policy as a senator. The ideas of modernisation theory resonated well with him; JFK had been in close contact with MIT social scientists during the 1950s, and took many of them to Washington with him upon his election. Kennedy saw the US as having to actively intervene in the development of the Third World in order to prevent revolutions and communist influence. Modernisation theory also provided the basis for his exciting rhetoric of new frontiers- Americans, having achieved their manifest destiny at home, could now take their mission to other parts of the world.
Latham looks at three case studies of the time, showing how the underlying ideology of modernisation influenced them all. The first, the Alliance for Progress, was an aid program between Latin America and the United States, which was inspired as an attempt to provide a credible alternative to Castroism and keep Latin America within the US sphere of influence. The second, the Peace Corps, were envisioned as a means to show that American’s could get “down and dirty” on the ground in the same ways as the communists. Peace Corps students were meant to show the appeals of the American, democratic way of life by their actions alone- their example would prove inspirational. The last policy, the strategic hamlets initiative in Vietnam was a heavily sophisticated attempt at creating new, loyal, west-loving citizens by changing their environment. As each of these policies failed in turn, the rhetoric and ideals of modernisation ere increasingly challenged, not least by the “new left”, who argued for a dramatic redistribution of the earth’s wealth.
Overall, I found Latham’s work engaging and convincing. What is most notable to me is the confidence of a pre-Vietnam America. Social scientists and policy makers (often the same people) really did think it was possible to remake the world in America’s image. In their confidence they drew from a long history of American confidence in itself, a confidence which must be reckoned with in any cultural study of the Cold War. I do take a more positive view on modernisation theory than Latham, particularly its role in providing consensus to American politics, but it is perhaps indicative to say that the language of the modernisation theorists is strikingly similar to that of the generals in Vietnam.
Michael Latham disagrees, and claims that we must look at modernisation theory as an ideology, the American equivalent of the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Soviet Union. Rather than a collection of abstract ideas, modernisation was a state of mind, one which had direct links on policy. Whilst it was dressed up in the language of science and (naturally) modernity, modernisation theory had direct links with earlier American perceptions of the world, an imperial American perception which had been considered long banished.
President Kennedy had long called for a more interventionist foreign policy as a senator. The ideas of modernisation theory resonated well with him; JFK had been in close contact with MIT social scientists during the 1950s, and took many of them to Washington with him upon his election. Kennedy saw the US as having to actively intervene in the development of the Third World in order to prevent revolutions and communist influence. Modernisation theory also provided the basis for his exciting rhetoric of new frontiers- Americans, having achieved their manifest destiny at home, could now take their mission to other parts of the world.
Latham looks at three case studies of the time, showing how the underlying ideology of modernisation influenced them all. The first, the Alliance for Progress, was an aid program between Latin America and the United States, which was inspired as an attempt to provide a credible alternative to Castroism and keep Latin America within the US sphere of influence. The second, the Peace Corps, were envisioned as a means to show that American’s could get “down and dirty” on the ground in the same ways as the communists. Peace Corps students were meant to show the appeals of the American, democratic way of life by their actions alone- their example would prove inspirational. The last policy, the strategic hamlets initiative in Vietnam was a heavily sophisticated attempt at creating new, loyal, west-loving citizens by changing their environment. As each of these policies failed in turn, the rhetoric and ideals of modernisation ere increasingly challenged, not least by the “new left”, who argued for a dramatic redistribution of the earth’s wealth.
Overall, I found Latham’s work engaging and convincing. What is most notable to me is the confidence of a pre-Vietnam America. Social scientists and policy makers (often the same people) really did think it was possible to remake the world in America’s image. In their confidence they drew from a long history of American confidence in itself, a confidence which must be reckoned with in any cultural study of the Cold War. I do take a more positive view on modernisation theory than Latham, particularly its role in providing consensus to American politics, but it is perhaps indicative to say that the language of the modernisation theorists is strikingly similar to that of the generals in Vietnam.