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A review by heathward
Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War by Nancy Mitchell
5.0
Jimmy Carter in Africa
In Jimmy Carter in Africa, Nancy Mitchell examines the 39th president’s foreign policy in Africa as a means to offer a dramatic reassessment of his time in office. Her analysis focuses in particular on two important events; the transition to majority rule in Rhodesia and the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia. In Rhodesia Carter’s strategy was well-planned and carefully enacted- events in Ethiopia developed far more rapidly, making the war a useful way of analysing the reaction of the administration to crisis moments.
The book focuses on Jimmy Carter more than it does on Africa. Mitchell feels that the public, and indeed academic, view of Carter carries with it a number of misconceptions. In particular, she dislikes the idea that Carter had a confused foreign policy, one dictated by the struggle between his warring advisors Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance. Rather than being dominated by these two men, Mitchell states that Carter was in fact firmly in control. Confusion stemmed from the inability of the president to ably articulate his policies to the people, which in turn arose due to his non-ideological approach to issues. Rather than being a naïve liberal dominated by his conception of human rights, Mitchell argues that Carter was as much of a Cold Warrior as the other détente era presidents, Nixon and Ford. As evidence for this she cites his Africa policy- his cynical courting of militant Somalia in 1977 and his fear of a communist-back faction winning the struggle in Rhodesia. Fear of Cuban intervention dominated US foreign policy thinking following Kissinger’s disastrous adventure in Angola. Another Cuban victory would have massively undermined US prestige in the world- Carter applied a form of domino theory to his policy- If Rhodesia fell, would South Africa be next?
Carter showed a deep interest in events in Rhodesia, and himself and close advisor Andy Young were already planning their future policy towards the nation in 1976 (in contrast to another misconception, that Carter came to Washington as a provincial farmer with little knowledge of world affairs). Mitchell states that what so enticed Carter about Rhodesia was race, in particular the similarities which the president believed existed between the function of white-minority rule there and his own upbringing in segregated Georgia. Whilst Mitchell acknowledges the historical flaws in this conception, she notes that it was vital as the frame through which the president and Andy Young saw the world. It enabled both men to defend their policy against vicious attacks from the House of Representatives and the belated despair of America’s failing British ally.
In the Ogaden War, the Carter administration responded in a more confused and contradictory manner. The reason for this, in Mitchell’s argument, was that Carter was too controlling a leader- he insisted on making all decisions, and he did so slowly, problematic in such a crisis (as in Iran two years later). Still, she makes the point that there really was no practical way for the US to intervene in the conflict, pointing out the ridiculousness of Brzezinski’s plan to use Saudi/ Iranian troops against the elite Cuban regiments. The war in Ethiopia was also a black-black conflict, lacking the important racial element which brought Carter’s attention to the South of the continent. Still, Mitchell points out that the “defeat” of the US in the war, although used as another example of Carter’s weakness, actually hurt the Soviets more. They lost a key naval base in Somalia, the pride of their African empire, and gained only impoverished Ethiopia.
Overall, I found Jimmy Carter’s Africa policy to be an effective way of revaluating the president, at the same time as being honest as to his weaknesses. When he had the time, Carter could develop effective policies which advanced US aims in the Cold War without sacrificing American lives. In moments of crisis, however, his lack of ideology and insistence on control led to a confused foreign policy and accusations of weakness from the growing neoconservative movement. Whilst I disagree that Zimbabwe can be considered much of a success story following Mugabe’s tyranny, America certainly came out of the Carter years with a better position on the African continent than it had held four years previous, regardless of Reaganite rhetoric.
In Jimmy Carter in Africa, Nancy Mitchell examines the 39th president’s foreign policy in Africa as a means to offer a dramatic reassessment of his time in office. Her analysis focuses in particular on two important events; the transition to majority rule in Rhodesia and the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia. In Rhodesia Carter’s strategy was well-planned and carefully enacted- events in Ethiopia developed far more rapidly, making the war a useful way of analysing the reaction of the administration to crisis moments.
The book focuses on Jimmy Carter more than it does on Africa. Mitchell feels that the public, and indeed academic, view of Carter carries with it a number of misconceptions. In particular, she dislikes the idea that Carter had a confused foreign policy, one dictated by the struggle between his warring advisors Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance. Rather than being dominated by these two men, Mitchell states that Carter was in fact firmly in control. Confusion stemmed from the inability of the president to ably articulate his policies to the people, which in turn arose due to his non-ideological approach to issues. Rather than being a naïve liberal dominated by his conception of human rights, Mitchell argues that Carter was as much of a Cold Warrior as the other détente era presidents, Nixon and Ford. As evidence for this she cites his Africa policy- his cynical courting of militant Somalia in 1977 and his fear of a communist-back faction winning the struggle in Rhodesia. Fear of Cuban intervention dominated US foreign policy thinking following Kissinger’s disastrous adventure in Angola. Another Cuban victory would have massively undermined US prestige in the world- Carter applied a form of domino theory to his policy- If Rhodesia fell, would South Africa be next?
Carter showed a deep interest in events in Rhodesia, and himself and close advisor Andy Young were already planning their future policy towards the nation in 1976 (in contrast to another misconception, that Carter came to Washington as a provincial farmer with little knowledge of world affairs). Mitchell states that what so enticed Carter about Rhodesia was race, in particular the similarities which the president believed existed between the function of white-minority rule there and his own upbringing in segregated Georgia. Whilst Mitchell acknowledges the historical flaws in this conception, she notes that it was vital as the frame through which the president and Andy Young saw the world. It enabled both men to defend their policy against vicious attacks from the House of Representatives and the belated despair of America’s failing British ally.
In the Ogaden War, the Carter administration responded in a more confused and contradictory manner. The reason for this, in Mitchell’s argument, was that Carter was too controlling a leader- he insisted on making all decisions, and he did so slowly, problematic in such a crisis (as in Iran two years later). Still, she makes the point that there really was no practical way for the US to intervene in the conflict, pointing out the ridiculousness of Brzezinski’s plan to use Saudi/ Iranian troops against the elite Cuban regiments. The war in Ethiopia was also a black-black conflict, lacking the important racial element which brought Carter’s attention to the South of the continent. Still, Mitchell points out that the “defeat” of the US in the war, although used as another example of Carter’s weakness, actually hurt the Soviets more. They lost a key naval base in Somalia, the pride of their African empire, and gained only impoverished Ethiopia.
Overall, I found Jimmy Carter’s Africa policy to be an effective way of revaluating the president, at the same time as being honest as to his weaknesses. When he had the time, Carter could develop effective policies which advanced US aims in the Cold War without sacrificing American lives. In moments of crisis, however, his lack of ideology and insistence on control led to a confused foreign policy and accusations of weakness from the growing neoconservative movement. Whilst I disagree that Zimbabwe can be considered much of a success story following Mugabe’s tyranny, America certainly came out of the Carter years with a better position on the African continent than it had held four years previous, regardless of Reaganite rhetoric.