Scan barcode
A review by heathward
West Germany and the Portuguese Dictatorship, 1968-1974: Between Cold War and Colonialism by R. Lopes
5.0
In depth look at a fascinating period of Cold War/ imperial history. Rudi Viera Lopes argues that the SPD-FDP coalition governments which came to power in the FRG in this period opposed the Portuguese dictatorship/ colonial empire ideologically, but that they chose to cooperate with the regime out of a focus on European stability and Ostpolitik. In doing so, Brandt prioritised North over South, a decision which he would later come to regret.
The West German government hoped that the Portuguese dictatorship could reformed in an anti-colonial direction over a long period of time, and so were taken back by the 1974 coup. Much of the groundwork had been made, however, for the integration of the Portuguese into 'Europe' as the SPD had previously seen integration as a means to combat Portuguese authoritarianism.
The most interesting chapter for myself was chapter VI, which discussed how individual social democrats pursued an anti-colonial strategy with the awareness, if not open consent, of the government. In particular the FES played a key role as a semi-indepemdent actor. However, this also had the effect of highlighting the government's own ambiguous position.
Quotes:
1. “West German policy towards the Estado Novo between 1968 and 1974 was deeply ambiguous: it was essentially a policy of continuity, while containing remarkable elements of discontinuity. The main reason for this ambiguity was the tension- on ideological as well as material levels- between the policy that Bonn envisioned towards the Cold War in Europe and the policy that various forces envisioned towards Lisbon’s resistance to decolonisation in Africa.” (11)
2. “Although the governments of the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands did not direct their attacks at West Germany, they nevertheless exerted a type of peer pressure over Bonn. Not only did their governments belong to the same family as Willy Brandt’s SPD, they brought the discussion to forums where the FRG participated- including NATO and the EEC, forcing the Bonn government to take a side.” (52)
3. “The parliamentary wing of the SPD played a particularly significant role by scrutinising and questioning many of the government's potential links to the wars. Consequently, Bonn did not place any new orders to the Portuguese arms and munitions industry; it only allowed the completion previously agreed deals. More importantly, the supply of military equipment grew increasingly precarious. This tendency culminated in the decision of the Federal Security Council, in May 1971, to only allow further military exports to Portugal in exchange for an end-use clause explicitly exempting the hardware's use in Africa. Lisbon's initial refusal to comply led to a periodic over two years during which almost no military sales took place.” (159)
4. At the 1973 SPD congress, “The ranks of the SPD approved two resolutions aimed against the Estado Novo. One of them stated that the SPD was ‘on the side of the peoples of the Third World’ and it requested that the federal government use its influence in Europe to put an end to colonialism, including through the granting of humanitarian relief to liberation movements. The other important resolution demanded that Bonn, independently from its alliances and obligations, cease any supply of weapons to dictatorships, namely Spain, Greece and Portugal.”
“Erhard Eppler wrote an article for the SPD's official newspaper Vorwärts, with the cover date 26 July 1973. The minister attacked the dictatorship’s refusal to decolonise, which he saw as the main cause of the acts of ‘terrorism’ perpetrated by both sides of the conflict. Contrasting the Portuguese case with the Vietnam War, Eppler condoned Bonn's low profile regarding the latter because it had been an American internal matter, but spoke of the need to raise international pressure regarding the former, which involved a European nation.” (192)
5. “The SPD independently sought to reach out to the African movements. A leading personality behind this strategy was Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, a committed anti-colonialist who as MP had founded the lobby group Angola-Komitee in 1964 with the purpose of promoting Portuguese decolonisation. Wischnewski, who headed Bonn's ministry for economic Co-operation from December 1966 until October 1968, had even approached PAIGC's Amílcar Cabral during his time in office.”
“During the French-Algerian war, Wischnewski had arranged for the SPD to secretly support the Algerian Liberation Front.”(219-220)
6. “The FRG helped sustain the Lisbon dictatorship and consequently the process of Portuguese resistance to decolonisation. This was not Bonn’s primary intention, but rather a by-product of contemporary West German priorities, namely the safeguarding of neue Ostpolitik and a preference for peaceful evolutionary solutions, as well as a flawed interpretation of Portuguese European and colonial reality.” (237)
7. “Only by acknowledging that the Cold War did not determine actions, but the perceptions which shaped those actions, can we begin to accurately evaluate it’s role in the history of colonial and post colonial politics.” (248)
The West German government hoped that the Portuguese dictatorship could reformed in an anti-colonial direction over a long period of time, and so were taken back by the 1974 coup. Much of the groundwork had been made, however, for the integration of the Portuguese into 'Europe' as the SPD had previously seen integration as a means to combat Portuguese authoritarianism.
The most interesting chapter for myself was chapter VI, which discussed how individual social democrats pursued an anti-colonial strategy with the awareness, if not open consent, of the government. In particular the FES played a key role as a semi-indepemdent actor. However, this also had the effect of highlighting the government's own ambiguous position.
Quotes:
1. “West German policy towards the Estado Novo between 1968 and 1974 was deeply ambiguous: it was essentially a policy of continuity, while containing remarkable elements of discontinuity. The main reason for this ambiguity was the tension- on ideological as well as material levels- between the policy that Bonn envisioned towards the Cold War in Europe and the policy that various forces envisioned towards Lisbon’s resistance to decolonisation in Africa.” (11)
2. “Although the governments of the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands did not direct their attacks at West Germany, they nevertheless exerted a type of peer pressure over Bonn. Not only did their governments belong to the same family as Willy Brandt’s SPD, they brought the discussion to forums where the FRG participated- including NATO and the EEC, forcing the Bonn government to take a side.” (52)
3. “The parliamentary wing of the SPD played a particularly significant role by scrutinising and questioning many of the government's potential links to the wars. Consequently, Bonn did not place any new orders to the Portuguese arms and munitions industry; it only allowed the completion previously agreed deals. More importantly, the supply of military equipment grew increasingly precarious. This tendency culminated in the decision of the Federal Security Council, in May 1971, to only allow further military exports to Portugal in exchange for an end-use clause explicitly exempting the hardware's use in Africa. Lisbon's initial refusal to comply led to a periodic over two years during which almost no military sales took place.” (159)
4. At the 1973 SPD congress, “The ranks of the SPD approved two resolutions aimed against the Estado Novo. One of them stated that the SPD was ‘on the side of the peoples of the Third World’ and it requested that the federal government use its influence in Europe to put an end to colonialism, including through the granting of humanitarian relief to liberation movements. The other important resolution demanded that Bonn, independently from its alliances and obligations, cease any supply of weapons to dictatorships, namely Spain, Greece and Portugal.”
“Erhard Eppler wrote an article for the SPD's official newspaper Vorwärts, with the cover date 26 July 1973. The minister attacked the dictatorship’s refusal to decolonise, which he saw as the main cause of the acts of ‘terrorism’ perpetrated by both sides of the conflict. Contrasting the Portuguese case with the Vietnam War, Eppler condoned Bonn's low profile regarding the latter because it had been an American internal matter, but spoke of the need to raise international pressure regarding the former, which involved a European nation.” (192)
5. “The SPD independently sought to reach out to the African movements. A leading personality behind this strategy was Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, a committed anti-colonialist who as MP had founded the lobby group Angola-Komitee in 1964 with the purpose of promoting Portuguese decolonisation. Wischnewski, who headed Bonn's ministry for economic Co-operation from December 1966 until October 1968, had even approached PAIGC's Amílcar Cabral during his time in office.”
“During the French-Algerian war, Wischnewski had arranged for the SPD to secretly support the Algerian Liberation Front.”(219-220)
6. “The FRG helped sustain the Lisbon dictatorship and consequently the process of Portuguese resistance to decolonisation. This was not Bonn’s primary intention, but rather a by-product of contemporary West German priorities, namely the safeguarding of neue Ostpolitik and a preference for peaceful evolutionary solutions, as well as a flawed interpretation of Portuguese European and colonial reality.” (237)
7. “Only by acknowledging that the Cold War did not determine actions, but the perceptions which shaped those actions, can we begin to accurately evaluate it’s role in the history of colonial and post colonial politics.” (248)