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philofox's review against another edition
4.5
This is the best single detailed chronology of the leadup to WWI, by a large margin. Its main shortcoming is that Clark writes as if he can disentangle himself from the normative issues that surround WWI historiography, while insinuating without outright arguing that Serbian policy had a highly blameworthy role.
I'm not one to personally take strong sides on the WWI "war guilt" question, which after more than a century I find exhausting. It should be very clear after this much scholarship that both the most extreme "German war guilt" thesis and its revisionist opponent are implausible, and that however we precisely weight e.g. Germany's blank cheque to Austria-Hungary vs. Serbian policy, or Franco-Russian collaboration vs. German misperceptions of British intentions, that there's plenty of blame to go around and that a multicausal system failure occurred. This is in contrast to WWII, which is an extremely clear case of a war of conquest and aggression on the part of the Axis powers.
While the ongoing tendency to want to find "the culprit" for WWI arguably continues to detract from our understanding of how this disaster happened, Clark does himself no favors by pretending he is above the fray while very clearly implicitly taking a side in it.
I'm not one to personally take strong sides on the WWI "war guilt" question, which after more than a century I find exhausting. It should be very clear after this much scholarship that both the most extreme "German war guilt" thesis and its revisionist opponent are implausible, and that however we precisely weight e.g. Germany's blank cheque to Austria-Hungary vs. Serbian policy, or Franco-Russian collaboration vs. German misperceptions of British intentions, that there's plenty of blame to go around and that a multicausal system failure occurred. This is in contrast to WWII, which is an extremely clear case of a war of conquest and aggression on the part of the Axis powers.
While the ongoing tendency to want to find "the culprit" for WWI arguably continues to detract from our understanding of how this disaster happened, Clark does himself no favors by pretending he is above the fray while very clearly implicitly taking a side in it.
ettie_aaron's review against another edition
4.0
A highly complex & detailed analysis of the lead-up to the First World War.
Pros:
- you get detailed looks not only at the characters involved but also their personalities and backgrounds which led them to their decision making
- highly complex story telling that explains the national rationalities and their motivations
- the author takes in certain post-war analyses & weighs them against the contemporary evidence, not necessarily to dispel them but to provide nuance
- Maurice Paléologue
- the author reminds you frequently who individuals are because there’s a lot of characters to introduce
Cons:
- the story is not always provided chronologically, though this is not to the fault of the author. You’ll have the main story you’re following, then interjected with a historical background from 20 or even 30 years prior that can take you out of the story—these are needed for the full context, but it can be jarring due to the jumps in chronology
- again, not to the fault of the author, but there are a LOT of names and they are not at all easy to keep track of. Especially in the earlier chapters where the internal politics of Serbia are concerned.
My overall rating would be a 4.3 or 4.5; an excellent book on the subject matter and very enlightening for an extremely complex topic.
Pros:
- you get detailed looks not only at the characters involved but also their personalities and backgrounds which led them to their decision making
- highly complex story telling that explains the national rationalities and their motivations
- the author takes in certain post-war analyses & weighs them against the contemporary evidence, not necessarily to dispel them but to provide nuance
- Maurice Paléologue
- the author reminds you frequently who individuals are because there’s a lot of characters to introduce
Cons:
- the story is not always provided chronologically, though this is not to the fault of the author. You’ll have the main story you’re following, then interjected with a historical background from 20 or even 30 years prior that can take you out of the story—these are needed for the full context, but it can be jarring due to the jumps in chronology
- again, not to the fault of the author, but there are a LOT of names and they are not at all easy to keep track of. Especially in the earlier chapters where the internal politics of Serbia are concerned.
My overall rating would be a 4.3 or 4.5; an excellent book on the subject matter and very enlightening for an extremely complex topic.
dimitribelgium's review against another edition
5.0
Simply one of the best books on the origins of the Great War. Take it from someone who wrote his master thesis on the pre-war military strategies of Belgium and along the way devoted too much time to the European dimension. Christopher Clark’s summary of the transformation of Europe between 1879 and 1907 from non-committed alliances into two military ‘blocs’ in two pages plus maps is a thing of beauty. The author clearly belongs to the revisionist camp. His identification of the hawks within the governments of the Great Powers correponds largely with the portraits in J.H.J. Andriessen’s “The Other Truth”: Sir Edward Grey, Conrad von Hötzendorf, Raymond Poincaré…etc.
His treatment of the German Empire is the best example. The dogmatic elevation of the Schlieffen plan goes hand in hand with a curiously passive attitude that is a far cry from the Teutonic bombast in the magistral writing of Barbara Tuchman. Enkreisung is not a mere diplomatic cover for ambitions towards world-domination in the controversial vein of Fritz Fischer. Rather, Germany sincerely experienced events as dictated by Russia and its allies. The balance of power slowly but irrevocably swung in their favour, fueled by the French construction of the Entente and the post-1905 Russian rearmament program. “Better war sooner than later” was an attitude found among all Powers, but most prevalent in Berlin. This is well shown in the discussion of the infamous military counsil of december 1912.
The familiar story of the clash of interests on the Balkan is set within the long-term Russian desire for domination of the Straits at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, dating back to the aftermath of the Crimean war. Populist Pan-slavism disguised a pragmatical support for whichever Balkan state gained prominence: Bulgaria at first, Serbia later on. It is interesting to note that a minority propagated a Far East policy in order to reverse the losses of the Russo-Japanese war as soon as the rearmaments would be completed, but this view never gained prominence.
On the Habsburg side, the political friction in the wake of the Compromise of 1867 adds complexity. Hungary, in spite of agressive maygarisation, always read developments on the peninsula in the light of a possible revolt in Transsylvania. Vienna itself most feared the ascent of a South Slav union, possibly resulting in numerous revolts by minorities within Austria-Hungary. In retrospect, this fear was overrated and the sympathy of future emperor Franz Ferdinand for a South Slav union as a third segment within the multiethnic empire politically quite astute.
Many familiar episodes on the road to Ypres situated on the Balkans get the royal treatment: the Balkan Wars, the Baghdad Railway and the German mission to Istanbul, to name a few, are elevated from anecdote to ‘sideshows’ which nonetheless serve as important precedents to 1914. In goes without saying that the story of Sarajevo is explored in depth, with some poignant paralels to the post-9/11 world thrown in for free.
France appears in a more traditional light, focused on the next clash with the German army, if less on the repossession of Alsace-Lorraine. Declasé and Poincaré remain the main characters, with the ambassador twins Carbon in support. These men provided a much-needed element of continuity for the foreign policy of a republic plagued by instable cabinets. It is striking how relentlessly France pressured her Entente partners into military commitment. The best example here is her distress at the Russian plan for a Napoleonic defense in depth, with a concentration in the interior while temporarily minimizing the mobilisation at the western frontiers. Sometimes she overestimated her success, traditionally exemplified by the last-minute reluctance of Great Britain to openly acknowledge joint operations against Germany.
Great Britain, lastly, receives compartively little attention. Three things stand out. First, the civilian sphere, dominated by party politics, exerciced greater control over the military was greater than in any other European power, which explains to a great extent the lack of commitment in spite of assurances by proponents such as Henry Wilson. Edward Grey and Winston Churchill had to overcome the majority of the cabinet at the last moment. Second, German domination of the Atlantic coast was never a primary concern. Rather, the Great Game and the defense of the Raj loomed largest in imperial policy. The origins of the Entente with France must be understood in this context, regardless of their naval cooperation between the Channel and the Mediterranean. The British Empire was willing to appease its Russian rival at the expense of alienating Germany.
This also brings me to the third point, which shocks my Belgian sensibilities. It is commonly presumed that the Brave Little Belgium attitude during WWI was preceeded by a genuine commitment by Great Britain to the preservation of Belgian neutrality. Less commonly known but still within the same attitude is the British preoccupation with the Channel ports and the estuary of the Scheldt, to convenience the assistance of the Royal Navy and an Expeditionary Force to Antwerp, last refuge of the Belgian Army. In reality, Germany was quite right to dismiss the 1831 treaty as a ‘scrap of paper’: Britain was happy to allow a limited intrusion of the German Army through Belgium, preferably south of the Meuse. Ironically, many Belgian politicians likewise considered minimal armed resistance to said intrusion as a fullfillment of their neutrality obligations.
The Balkan Wars, including the ‘Winter Crisis’ of 1912-13, provided Austria with trustworthy precedents for july 1914. Serbia seemed to be in the habit of backing down in the face of a military threat and Russia was reluctant to back her up. The other Great Powers univoquely helped difuse tensions rather than activating their military alliances. In addition, the military shows of force strained the finances of an imperial economy in decline. All together, an all-out war with Serbia appeared increasingly the sole solution to the next Balkan crisis.
The July crisis highlights the common deficiencies of the Great Powers. It is here that the main theme of Sleepwalkers reasserts itself. Minor remarks by biased diplomats or officials were overinterpreted as expressions of official foreign policy, because each country viewed itself in some way as dominated, even overpowered, by its neighbours. This attitude introduced long-term errors in what appeared to be policies based on reason and precedents. Furthermore, most of the political elite was on holiday and few judged the present Balkan crisis to be in need of closer scrutiny than its predecessors.
In a Europe dominated by monarchies, the (in)actions of the sovereigns merrit examination. De facto the book focuses on Wilhelm II and Nicolas II. The Kaiser figures with far less prerogative as traditionally assumed; the Tsar as his equal in indecisiveness. This is pointingly illustrated by their informal mid-river military talk, the implications of which horrified their cabinets back home. George V and emperor Franz Joseph remain virtually invisible.
Unfortunately enough, the story remains equally silent on Italy and the neutral countries, save a brief forray during the July crisis about Swedish neutrality. Irregardless of their limited weight within the international alliance system, the secondary points of view could’ve attributed to the perceptions of Great Power policy. Clark made it as far as occasionally citing Dutch & Belgian ambassadors/consuls; the archives are touched upon but not to full use. Paul Kennedy’s [b:The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914|811863|The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914|Paul Kennedy|http://images.gr-assets.com/books/1365463998s/811863.jpg|3788963] appears underused in British naval matters such as the 1902 treaty with Japan and the ill-fated Haldane mission. As it is, the array of sources is impressive, with the inclusion of local studies from Serbia, Bulgaria etc. Classics like Albertini’s 3-volume diplomatic analysis ([b:The Origins of the War of 1914|1117163|The Origins of the War of 1914|Luigi Albertini|http://images.gr-assets.com/books/1407196468s/1117163.jpg|1104187], 1941) are used on their own strengths, such as the use of living witnesses to the events of the Belle Epoque.
Read James Joll ([b:The Origins of the First World War|33540|The Origins of the First World War|James Joll|http://images.gr-assets.com/books/1393227461s/33540.jpg|33603], 3 editions) for the facts. Read Barbara Tuchman ([b:The Guns of August|11366|The Guns of August|Barbara W. Tuchman|http://images.gr-assets.com/books/1431760956s/11366.jpg|1884932])for the atmosphere. Read Christopher Clark for the understanding.
His treatment of the German Empire is the best example. The dogmatic elevation of the Schlieffen plan goes hand in hand with a curiously passive attitude that is a far cry from the Teutonic bombast in the magistral writing of Barbara Tuchman. Enkreisung is not a mere diplomatic cover for ambitions towards world-domination in the controversial vein of Fritz Fischer. Rather, Germany sincerely experienced events as dictated by Russia and its allies. The balance of power slowly but irrevocably swung in their favour, fueled by the French construction of the Entente and the post-1905 Russian rearmament program. “Better war sooner than later” was an attitude found among all Powers, but most prevalent in Berlin. This is well shown in the discussion of the infamous military counsil of december 1912.
The familiar story of the clash of interests on the Balkan is set within the long-term Russian desire for domination of the Straits at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, dating back to the aftermath of the Crimean war. Populist Pan-slavism disguised a pragmatical support for whichever Balkan state gained prominence: Bulgaria at first, Serbia later on. It is interesting to note that a minority propagated a Far East policy in order to reverse the losses of the Russo-Japanese war as soon as the rearmaments would be completed, but this view never gained prominence.
On the Habsburg side, the political friction in the wake of the Compromise of 1867 adds complexity. Hungary, in spite of agressive maygarisation, always read developments on the peninsula in the light of a possible revolt in Transsylvania. Vienna itself most feared the ascent of a South Slav union, possibly resulting in numerous revolts by minorities within Austria-Hungary. In retrospect, this fear was overrated and the sympathy of future emperor Franz Ferdinand for a South Slav union as a third segment within the multiethnic empire politically quite astute.
Many familiar episodes on the road to Ypres situated on the Balkans get the royal treatment: the Balkan Wars, the Baghdad Railway and the German mission to Istanbul, to name a few, are elevated from anecdote to ‘sideshows’ which nonetheless serve as important precedents to 1914. In goes without saying that the story of Sarajevo is explored in depth, with some poignant paralels to the post-9/11 world thrown in for free.
France appears in a more traditional light, focused on the next clash with the German army, if less on the repossession of Alsace-Lorraine. Declasé and Poincaré remain the main characters, with the ambassador twins Carbon in support. These men provided a much-needed element of continuity for the foreign policy of a republic plagued by instable cabinets. It is striking how relentlessly France pressured her Entente partners into military commitment. The best example here is her distress at the Russian plan for a Napoleonic defense in depth, with a concentration in the interior while temporarily minimizing the mobilisation at the western frontiers. Sometimes she overestimated her success, traditionally exemplified by the last-minute reluctance of Great Britain to openly acknowledge joint operations against Germany.
Great Britain, lastly, receives compartively little attention. Three things stand out. First, the civilian sphere, dominated by party politics, exerciced greater control over the military was greater than in any other European power, which explains to a great extent the lack of commitment in spite of assurances by proponents such as Henry Wilson. Edward Grey and Winston Churchill had to overcome the majority of the cabinet at the last moment. Second, German domination of the Atlantic coast was never a primary concern. Rather, the Great Game and the defense of the Raj loomed largest in imperial policy. The origins of the Entente with France must be understood in this context, regardless of their naval cooperation between the Channel and the Mediterranean. The British Empire was willing to appease its Russian rival at the expense of alienating Germany.
This also brings me to the third point, which shocks my Belgian sensibilities. It is commonly presumed that the Brave Little Belgium attitude during WWI was preceeded by a genuine commitment by Great Britain to the preservation of Belgian neutrality. Less commonly known but still within the same attitude is the British preoccupation with the Channel ports and the estuary of the Scheldt, to convenience the assistance of the Royal Navy and an Expeditionary Force to Antwerp, last refuge of the Belgian Army. In reality, Germany was quite right to dismiss the 1831 treaty as a ‘scrap of paper’: Britain was happy to allow a limited intrusion of the German Army through Belgium, preferably south of the Meuse. Ironically, many Belgian politicians likewise considered minimal armed resistance to said intrusion as a fullfillment of their neutrality obligations.
The Balkan Wars, including the ‘Winter Crisis’ of 1912-13, provided Austria with trustworthy precedents for july 1914. Serbia seemed to be in the habit of backing down in the face of a military threat and Russia was reluctant to back her up. The other Great Powers univoquely helped difuse tensions rather than activating their military alliances. In addition, the military shows of force strained the finances of an imperial economy in decline. All together, an all-out war with Serbia appeared increasingly the sole solution to the next Balkan crisis.
The July crisis highlights the common deficiencies of the Great Powers. It is here that the main theme of Sleepwalkers reasserts itself. Minor remarks by biased diplomats or officials were overinterpreted as expressions of official foreign policy, because each country viewed itself in some way as dominated, even overpowered, by its neighbours. This attitude introduced long-term errors in what appeared to be policies based on reason and precedents. Furthermore, most of the political elite was on holiday and few judged the present Balkan crisis to be in need of closer scrutiny than its predecessors.
In a Europe dominated by monarchies, the (in)actions of the sovereigns merrit examination. De facto the book focuses on Wilhelm II and Nicolas II. The Kaiser figures with far less prerogative as traditionally assumed; the Tsar as his equal in indecisiveness. This is pointingly illustrated by their informal mid-river military talk, the implications of which horrified their cabinets back home. George V and emperor Franz Joseph remain virtually invisible.
Unfortunately enough, the story remains equally silent on Italy and the neutral countries, save a brief forray during the July crisis about Swedish neutrality. Irregardless of their limited weight within the international alliance system, the secondary points of view could’ve attributed to the perceptions of Great Power policy. Clark made it as far as occasionally citing Dutch & Belgian ambassadors/consuls; the archives are touched upon but not to full use. Paul Kennedy’s [b:The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914|811863|The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914|Paul Kennedy|http://images.gr-assets.com/books/1365463998s/811863.jpg|3788963] appears underused in British naval matters such as the 1902 treaty with Japan and the ill-fated Haldane mission. As it is, the array of sources is impressive, with the inclusion of local studies from Serbia, Bulgaria etc. Classics like Albertini’s 3-volume diplomatic analysis ([b:The Origins of the War of 1914|1117163|The Origins of the War of 1914|Luigi Albertini|http://images.gr-assets.com/books/1407196468s/1117163.jpg|1104187], 1941) are used on their own strengths, such as the use of living witnesses to the events of the Belle Epoque.
Read James Joll ([b:The Origins of the First World War|33540|The Origins of the First World War|James Joll|http://images.gr-assets.com/books/1393227461s/33540.jpg|33603], 3 editions) for the facts. Read Barbara Tuchman ([b:The Guns of August|11366|The Guns of August|Barbara W. Tuchman|http://images.gr-assets.com/books/1431760956s/11366.jpg|1884932])for the atmosphere. Read Christopher Clark for the understanding.
jonahsaisquoi's review against another edition
5.0
Substantive, colorful and interesting for any student of WWI, Diplomatic History or broader International Relations.
Each third has something unique to contribute. While many liked the final third of the book, I really enjoyed the deep-dive into the Austrian-Serbian dynamic that occupied the first. The second, while undoubtedly the most dense and complex, can be a fun intellectual excercise to read through an IR theory lens. Some totally new central arguments, such as British threat perceptions and subsequent appeasement of Russia as the basis of the Anglo-Russian alliance also added a great deal of depth and clarity.
However, would not recommend as an introduction to WWI. Reading some other general war history (Keegan's, Stevenson's) first would add immensely.
Each third has something unique to contribute. While many liked the final third of the book, I really enjoyed the deep-dive into the Austrian-Serbian dynamic that occupied the first. The second, while undoubtedly the most dense and complex, can be a fun intellectual excercise to read through an IR theory lens. Some totally new central arguments, such as British threat perceptions and subsequent appeasement of Russia as the basis of the Anglo-Russian alliance also added a great deal of depth and clarity.
However, would not recommend as an introduction to WWI. Reading some other general war history (Keegan's, Stevenson's) first would add immensely.
colinandersbrodd's review against another edition
5.0
A comprehensive history of the beginning of the Great War
This book attempts to cover an incredibly complex topic - how the Great War began in 1914. It furthermore tries to do this in a very comprehensive way, from all perspectives - a massive undertaking, to be sure! The mountain of information is treated deftly and presented fairly readably. Definitely worth the read for anyone with an interest in the histories of the World Wars . . .
This book attempts to cover an incredibly complex topic - how the Great War began in 1914. It furthermore tries to do this in a very comprehensive way, from all perspectives - a massive undertaking, to be sure! The mountain of information is treated deftly and presented fairly readably. Definitely worth the read for anyone with an interest in the histories of the World Wars . . .
graziella67's review against another edition
4.0
Saggio ricchissimo di dettagli, che spesso lo rendevano difficile da seguire.
Ho dovuto leggere con lentezza, per cogliere tutti i dati proposti. E' una lettura per addetti ai lavori e per chi, come me, ama visceralmente la Storia.
Ho dovuto leggere con lentezza, per cogliere tutti i dati proposti. E' una lettura per addetti ai lavori e per chi, come me, ama visceralmente la Storia.