Caleb Carr's analysis of the workings of terrorism, which he wrote after the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan but before the invasion of Iraq, is clear, well organized, and compelling. He makes an eloquent case for seeing terrorism as counterproductive as well as immoral, whether practiced by groups like Al Qaeda or by nations either in the course of fighting wars or in the ways the CIA and KGB have used it at times. The book explains the idea of limited war, as seen in actions that attack only military targets and/or the political leaders of the enemy, and offers examples like Frederick the Great, who fought a number of wars with minimal military casualties (on either side) and even fewer civilians killed or wounded; that king achieved these results by relying on maneuvering his opponents into positions from which they could see that Frederick was sure to win if pitched battles were fought, leading them to surrender. As Carr points out, this is basically the approach described by Sun Tzu in The Art of War and by Liddell Hart in Strategy.
Studying the practices and results of strategies based on terrorizing enemies, with examples from groups like Al Qaeda and the PLO to insurgencies to regular military forces targeting civilians, he points out that these methods end up generating hostility and stiffer resistance rather than intimidated surrender.

I'd have given this book five stars except for a significant point I believe the author got wrong. He states categorically that an international terrorist group like Al Qaeda cannot exist or function without a host government somewhere providing support, i.e. sanctuary, training, weapons, and funding. That view is in error - terrorist groups are also able to base themselves and function in and from failed states, governments lacking the strength to prevent the terrorists from using their nations' territories for havens and training and obtaining funding from many sources including individual supporters around the world. The last few decades have seen this happening in places like Somalia, Afghanistan, and potentially in Iraq if its government can't control its territories, borders, and people once the U.S. military and other foreign forces leave.

Still, this is a very worthwhile read for anyone interested in these issues.

This book has been in my To-Read queue for years, and I could not have been more disappointed.
Goodreads says this book was published in March 2003 at a time when I was probably waiting in a tent in Kuwait about to invade Iraq with the 1st Marine Division, and here in 2020 we all remember how that little misadventure went, as well as the rest of the regional shit-show since then.
So to hear him praising Donald Rumsfeld in the introduction was a gut-punch. In the conclusion he will actually talk about how great Predator Drones are and how once we have the balls to use them the days of civilian casualties are over! In between that are a lot of cherry-picked examples of terrorism/warfare against civilians that he will interpret to fit his thesis about how that this is strategy doomed to fail and total war is inferior to limited war. I expected a better contemplation of Terrorism, and I got a really long book report good for maybe a C+ or B- in a low level college course. What he's saying often has value, but you already can't trust him. You don't have to trust me either, check out some of the 3, 2, and 1 star reviews of this book. They start really nailing down a lot of the issues with this book a lot more effectively than I can.

This is Carr at his worst. He uses all the trappings of scholarly language, but none of the substance. He skips from subject to subject, war to war, without ever giving the impression that he's doing anything more than citing examples that agree with him. He misuses terms (canon vs. gun, e.g.) and never stops long enough to dwell on anything that might undermine his skimpy thesis.

A very interesting analysis of the use of terrorism & some of the theories of warfare throughout the ages. It questions US tactics, which some readers will probably not appreciate. I think everyone should read this book--especially following on the heels of George W. Bush's spectacularly failed presidency.

There were several very good things about this book. First, Carr gives a very concise, readable history of terror through the ages, the growth and ultimate descent into incompetence of the US intelligence establishment (the story of James Forrestal was a new one on me) and I could note no overt bias in terms of one political party or theory over any other...though I'm not so sure about Carr and American "Exceptionalism." Sometimes it seems like he believed it, other times not.

Now the bad thing: I submit that this work is not an attempt to impartially lay out all the historical facts, fall how they may, and then draw conclusions. I believe Carr started from the thesis that terrorism never worked in the long run and never will work as a tool of policy against civilians, and then ignored anything that didn't fit the thesis. Like the reigns of Stalin and Mao, both of whom slaughtered millions and died in bed. Or Pol Pot. Who was not overthrown due to any or all of his acts of terror (20% of the population was eliminated, supposedly), but was forcibly removed via invasion from Vietnam.

And quite frankly this procrustean approach to history left a sour taste in my mouth. This is polemic, this is revisionism. What it ain't is objective history.

Since the book is ten years old I don't fault him for his praise of Rumsfeld, but I'm not sure how a military doctrine like "shock and awe" is not going to (a) kill a lot of civilians and (b) leave a gigantic mess in its wake. However, Rumsfeld had received some positive press about bringing the armed forces into the "21st century," and anyone making noises about changing things at the Pentagon deserved at least a chance.